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Abstract 
We investigate the impact of consumer search and competition on pricing 
strategies in Germany’s electricity retail. We utilize a unique panel dataset on spatially 
varying search requests at major online price comparison websites to construct a direct 
measure of search intensity and combine this information with zip code level data on 
electricity tariffs between 2011 and 2014. The paper stands out by explaining price 
dispersion by differing pricing strategies of former incumbents and entrant firms, which 
are distinct in their attributable shares in informed versus uninformed consumers. Our 
empirical results suggest causal evidence for an inverted U-shape effect of consumer 
search intensity on price dispersion in a clearinghouse environment as in Stahl (1989). 
The dispersion is caused by opposite pricing strategies of incumbents and entrants, 
with incumbents initially increasing and entrants initially decreasing tariffs as a 
reaction to more consumer search. We also find an inverted U-shape effect of 
competition on price dispersion, consistent with theoretical findings by Janssen and 
Moraga-González (2004). Again, the effect can be explained by opposing pricing 
strategies of incumbents and entrants.  
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1. Introduction 
For the law of one price – as known from the standard homogeneous goods 
Bertrand model – to be valid, consumers must be aware of all offered prices for the 
product (Stigler, 1961). Electricity may be considered as such a kind of product, since 
it does not matter for the final consumer where and how it was produced. Therefore, 
one may assume that the transition from local monopoly supply to a more competitive 
environment after market liberalization should lead to price convergence with 
additional firm entry, until the law of one price holds. We focus on the German retail 
market, which was liberalized in 1999 (when the EU Directive 96/92/EC came into 
force). Since then, customers have had the freedom to choose their electricity supplier. 
For example, in 2014 a household customer had the choice between 73 and 198 
providers, depending on its location. Nevertheless, even though 17 years have passed 
since, our data reveal that price dispersion has been pronounced and persisting despite 
considerable firm entry. 
One possible explanation would be that electricity only appears to be a 
homogenous product, yet there might be some form of product differentiation, such as 
differences in service quality, certification with a “green” label1, or marketing. Giulietti 
et al. (2014, p.559), however, argue that “product differentiation (…) is unlikely to be 
important in explaining differences between large established firms selling such a 
fundamentally homogenous product.” Moreover, Stigler (1961) argues that not all of 
the observed price dispersion can be attributed to (marginal) product differentiation. In 
his view, the existence of significant search frictions directly induces price dispersion 
even in homogeneous goods markets. Thus, “price dispersion is a manifestation – and, 
indeed is a measure of ignorance in the market.” (Stigler 1961, p.214). While theory 
proofs that there will be no price dispersion when either all or no consumers are 
informed, there will be price dispersion in between (Stahl, 1989).  
The nexus between search frictions, competition, and price dispersion for 
homogenous goods has received much attention in the literature. Theoretical studies 
(e.g. Stahl, 1989; Baye and Morgan, 2001; Janssen and Moraga-González, 2004) show 
that for homogenous goods, such as electricity, price dispersion may represent an 
equilibrium outcome when customers differ in their search intensities. Thus, it may be 
1 In our sample, less than 4% of all search requests relate to tariffs with eco-labels. Therefore, in the 
present application we exclude search requests that only consider eco label tariffs in order to rule out 
pricing effects from such a form of product differentiation. However, the results remain fully robust when 
these searches are also included. 
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beneficial for firms to either charge a high price for customers with low (or no) search 
intensity, or to charge a low price for customers who do engage in costly search for 
price quotations.2 Moreover, the number of firms may affect price dispersion and there 
may be reverse causality running from price dispersion to search intensity. 
We add on this topic by analyzing how both consumer information and 
competition impact on price dispersion and prices in the German electricity retail 
market for the period 2011–2014. This paper is the first empirical attempt to analyze 
these relations altogether. Importantly, we are the first to employ a unique dataset on 
actual consumer search requests as a direct measure of search intensity in a panel data 
context. Furthermore, we are able to consider the endogenous nature of search with 
respect to price and price dispersion. The most important decisive feature is our ability 
to distinguish the price setting behavior of the local incumbent suppliers – whose 
consumers are uninformed –from the cheapest entrant firms – whose consumers are 
informed. Hence, we are not only able to investigate the effects of both consumer 
search and competition on price dispersion, but also to deduct how the incumbents and 
entrants set their prices. It is this combination of (1) applying a direct measure of 
search intensity, (2) recognizing the endogeneity of search intensity and (3) taking 
advantage of heterogeneous shares of informed versus uninformed consumers between 
incumbents and entrants in our empirical analysis that makes our study painting a 
fuller picture of the intricate relations. 
In our sample, each of the 8,824 German zip codes is served by one of the 777 local 
incumbent electricity retailer, which represents the former local monopoly supplier. 
Prior to market liberalization, the local incumbent would have served all local 
customers in its distribution grid area. After the liberalization, those customers with 
low search costs were more likely to change to a cheaper entrant supplier, while 
customers with high search costs were more likely to stay with the incumbent. From 
this, we claim that in particular the local incumbent retailer is associated with 
customers with high search costs and thus low search intensity, while the entrant 
retailers attract customers with no or low search costs and thus high search intensity.3 
2 In this sense, Giulietti et al. (2014) highlight that search costs represent the main reason for low 
switching behavior and for observing large price differences between incumbents and entrants in 
electricity retail in the UK. 
3 In this regard, there is evidence of significant search costs. Giulietti et al. (2014) point to high search 
costs in electricity retail in the UK, and of Hortacsu et al. (2015) find that customers of the incumbent 
only search in about 2% of months or approximately once every 4–5 years. 
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Thus, we may draw inference about price setting of incumbents and entrants from 
heterogeneity in consumer information, which has not been examined thus far. 
Our data provide suitable and detailed spatially varying measures for the 
dependent variables (price dispersion, price of cheapest entrant, and price of 
incumbent) and for our main variables of interest, namely the number of firms 
competing for customers and consumer search intensity. The latter variable is hardly 
observable and, hence, generally unknown to the researcher (Baye et al., 2006).4 We 
utilize information on all search requests (i.e. clicks) from the main German online 
price comparison platforms for electricity retail tariffs for the period 2011–2014 to 
develop a direct measure of consumer information. Price comparison websites display 
all retail tariffs available at the address of the respective customer. Hence, we interpret 
consumer search in the sense of a non-sequential clearinghouse model as in Stahl 
(1989).5 
We stress that sequential search models may have been more accurate in picturing 
consumers’ price quotations in electricity retail in the past when online comparison 
platforms were less prevalent and, thus, consumers had to search for information about 
individual firms’ prices. For example, Giulietti et al. (2014) investigate the period 
2002–2005 for the U.K. electricity retail market, where consumer search was mainly 
driven by door-to-door selling of sales representatives of the respective electricity 
suppliers, and thus sequential search may be an adequate model.6 For the recent 
period, simultaneous search models (and in particular clearinghouse models; see Baye 
et al., 2006) may have become more precise due to the emergence of comprehensive 
online search platforms as the standard searching devices (Montgomery et al. 2004).7 
Hence, at present, most of the costly search refers to finding out about the yearly 
electricity consumption level of the household and finding and opening the comparison 
website. Once this step is overcome, all available local prices in the zip code are shown 
to the consumer simultaneously. Giulietti et al. (2014, p. 576) corroborate that by 
stating that “(…) non-sequential search might be a good approximation of search 
behavior (…) if consumers use price comparison sites.” It is therefore reasonable that 
4 We come back to this issue in section 2.1 where we discuss the relevant empirical literature. 
5 See, for example, Brown and Goolsbee (2002), Pennersdorfer et al. (2015), and Tang et al. (2010) for 
similar approaches. 
6 Another example of sequential search would be consumers who call their local suppliers or visit their 
websites in order to make price quotations. After each quotation, the consumer may decide whether 
he/she continues to make another price quotation. 
7 Similarly, De los Santos et al. (2012) reach the conclusion that fixed sample size search models have 
become more accurate than sequential search models. 
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the consumer who engages in non-sequential search at an online comparison platform 
choses the cheapest price among all available local prices.8 
In our econometric approach we face one caveat that we cannot rule out potential 
simultaneity of both variables of interest, consumer search and competition, with the 
dependent variables, price dispersion and prices of incumbents and entrants. For this 
reason, we make use of an instrumental variables approach in order to circumvent the 
endogeneity problem and to determine causal effects of both variables. Our empirical 
results correspond well with findings from the respective theoretical literature. In line 
with Stahl (1989), we find that price dispersion follows an inverse U-shape relation 
with consumer information. That is, while more information leads to an increase in 
price dispersion to begin with, eventually – after a large part of consumers have 
informed themselves – price dispersion declines again. Somewhat in contrast to Stahl 
(1989), we find that the incumbent’s price increases albeit at a decreasing rate (inverse 
U-shape), and in line with Stahl (1989) the entrant's price decreases at a decreasing 
rate (U-shape) with the share of informed consumers. With respect to competition, 
price dispersion follows an inverse U-shape as indicated by Janssen and Moraga-
González (2004). Additional firms in the market cause the incumbent’s price to rise at 
a declining rate (inverse U-shape), whereas the entrant’s price falls at a declining rate 
(U-shape).  
In addition, we extend our findings on the price setting behavior of incumbent and 
entrant firms by alternative regressions on markups and Lerner indices. Besides, the 
robustness of our empirical findings is confirmed by running all regressions at different 
household sizes (at different yearly consumption levels). What is more, we show that 
semi-parametric estimation allowing for flexible functional relationships particularly 
support the parametric estimates.  
Importantly, our results show that the assumption of equal shares of informed 
versus uninformed consumers across firms – as generally assumed in the theoretical 
(e.g. Baye and Morgan, 2001; Stahl, 1989) and empirical (e.g. Chandra and Tappata, 
2011; Pennersdorfer et al., 2014; Tang et al., 2010) literature – is not necessarily 
tenable. Price setting incentives differ across firms, e.g. incumbents versus entrants, 
according to their "endowment" of informed and uninformed consumers. We contend 
8 This stands in marked contrast to a sequential search model, a consumer obtains one price quotation 
after another until he/she finds a price that lies below his/her reservation price. See Baye et al. (2005) 
for an overview and discussion of theoretical search models on both sequential and non-sequential 
consumer search. 
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that incumbent firms, which are associated with uninformed consumers, follow 
opposing and mutually exclusive pricing strategies with respect to both consumer 
search and competition, compared to entrant firms, which face substantially larger 
shares of informed consumers. This determines whether firms follow a pricing strategy 
to either attract market shares from new customers who are willing to engage in search 
(“business-stealing effect”) or to extract rents from existing customers who do not 
engage in search (“surplus-appropriation effect”).9 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the relevant 
theoretical and empirical literature. Section 3 provides a background on electricity 
retail in Germany. Section 4 describes the data and section 5 the econometric model. 
Section 6 discusses the results, and section 7 concludes. 
2. Relevant literature on price dispersion 
2.1.Relevant empirical literature on price dispersion 
The empirical literature on search frictions can be broadly categorized into studies 
(1) that look at the determinants and effects of price dispersion and (2) studies that 
structurally estimate search (and switching) costs or directly analyze the search 
behavior of consumers. Studies to (1) may be differentiated according to whether they 
incorporate direct information on search intensity and studies that do not. Moreover, 
some studies recognize the endogeneity of the intensity of search with price dispersion. 
Baye et al. (2006) provide an excellent survey. 
Studies that do not employ direct measures of search intensity include e.g. 
Sorensen (2000), Barron et al. (2004), Baye et al. (2004), Lewis (2008), and Chandra 
and Tappata (2011). Sorensen (2000), a seminal study in the field, finds that price-cost 
margins and price dispersion are negatively correlated with the purchase frequency of 
drugs, which can be interpreted as indirect evidence that search costs are important 
determinants of pricing strategies. Most studies find a negative effect of the number of 
sellers on price dispersion, e.g. for retail gasoline Barron et al. (2004) and Lewis (2008), 
and for electronics products Chandra and Tappata (2011) and Baye et al. (2004). Two 
results are worth mentioning in our context. 
9 In a similar manner, Ericson (2014, p. 44) refers to these effects as “investment motive” – firms acquire 
market shares in order to extract consumers’ rents in future periods – and “harvesting motive” – firms 
maximize profits from their existing customers. 
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Chandra and Tappata (2011) using detailed information on competitors’ locations 
in the U.S. retail gasoline market infer from their results that there is a negative 
relation between price dispersion and search intensity. However, they do not employ a 
direct measure of search intensity stating that it would be "ideal" to have a control 
group of no search. We take incumbents in electricity retail as such a "control" group, 
and show below that the relations between price dispersion/average prices and search 
intensity are intricate, namely non-linear and moreover dependent on the type of firms 
(low/high search intensity of customer base, i.e. incumbent or entrant). 
The novel feature of Lewis (2008) is that the study looks at differentiated products 
(high-brand versus other gasoline stations) and, somewhat similarly to us, assumes that 
customers of high-brand stations are less likely to search (we assume that incumbent 
customers are less likely to search). Accordingly, Lewis (2008) finds that while price 
dispersion declines with station density for low-brand stations, price dispersion does not 
decline with station density if the station is high-brand. This implies that consumer 
heterogeneity interacts with seller heterogeneity. While Lewis (2008)'s results are novel 
in that respect, the study does not employ a direct measure of search intensity, and 
thus cannot analyze its endogenous nature. In addition to analyzing different types of 
firms (incumbent versus entrants), we employ such a measure for search intensity 
(number of clicks per zip code looking for electricity retail tariffs) and also instrument 
for search intensity and competition by truly exogenous shifters (i.e. new households, 
moved households, age of household heads for search intensity; number of households 
for competition). 
The main drawback of the above studies is that they do not employ direct 
measures of search intensity and therefore they can only indirectly draw inference. 
Brown and Golsbee (2002), in contrast, use the variation in the share of consumers 
searching on the internet as their measure of consumer information.10 They find that 
increased internet usage has resulted in an increase of price dispersion (in the market 
for term-life insurance) at low levels and a decrease of price dispersion at high levels of 
internet usage. While we get similar results for electricity retail, there are two 
shortcomings in the Brown and Golsbee (2002) study we seek to avoid. First, it does 
not incorporate the competitive environment in life insurance, let alone type differences 
among firms, and second it does not tackle the potential endogeneity of internet usage, 
i.e. internet usage could be higher if there is more price dispersion, since expected gains 
10 Ellison and Ellison (2005) and Ellison and Ellison (2009) question the extent to which the internet has 
actually reduced consumer search costs due to "bait and wait" and "obfuscation" strategies used by firms. 
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from obtaining information from shopbots (i.e. online comparison platforms) will 
increase with the dispersion of prices (see also Baye and Morgan, 2001). 
More recently, Tang et al. (2010) examined the impact of changes in shopbot use 
on prices and price dispersion in online book retailing. An increase in shopbot use leads 
to decreases in average prices and price dispersion. Against the theory of an inverted 
U-shaped relation between price dispersion and search intensity, they find a U-shaped 
relation. The authors explain this conundrum by the fact that they only observe parts 
of the theoretical distribution of search but not the theoretical endpoints where no one 
searches and where everyone searches. While Pennersdorfer et al. (2014) do find an 
inverted U-shaped relation between price dispersion in the Austrian gasoline retail 
market and the share of informed consumers (as proxied by the share of commuters), 
Sengupta and Wiggins (2014) do not find a significant relation between price dispersion 
and internet usage for airline fares.  
Studies that structurally estimate search (and switching) costs include Giulietti et 
al. (2014, electricity retail), Hong and Shum (2006, economics and statistics textbooks), 
Honka (2014, US auto insurance) or Koulayev (2014, hotel search platforms), and 
studies that directly analyze the search behavior of consumers include Baye et al. 
(2009, broad range of products) and Hortacsu et al. (2015, residential electricity 
market).11 Two findings may be generalizable. First, search costs are substantial. 
Giulietti et al. (2014), e.g., analyze switching behavior in electricity retail, and estimate 
that roughly half the households had search costs exceeding 52 Pounds in the year 
2005. Second, search is endogenous. Baye et al. (2009) find that a firm enjoys a 60% 
jump in its clicks when it offers the lowest price at a comparison site. Hortacsu et al. 
(2015) find that – while households rarely search for alternative retailers in electricity – 
they search more after a "bill shock" in the previous months. Moreover, households 
attach a brand advantage to the incumbent. 
Summarizing the empirical literature, there are a lot of studies looking at the 
determinants of prices or price dispersion using a variety of competition measures such 
as the number of firms and/or the types of firms. Most studies find a negative effect of 
the number of firms on price dispersion. Studies employing direct measures of search 
intensity are, however, rare, and they most often find an inverted U-shaped relation 
between price dispersion and share of informed consumers. However, these studies 
either do not account for the endogeneity of search or do not account for the type 
11 See Baye et al. (2006) for a more comprehensive overview as well as Kim et al. (2011), and De los 
Santos et al. (2012). 
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differences across firms. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first study employing 
(1) a direct measure of search intensity, (2) recognizing its endogenous nature, and (3) 
distinguishing between types of firms (incumbents versus entrants). As we will show 
below, this is essential, because firms behave differently depending on the importance 
they attribute to informed versus uninformed customers. 
2.2.Relevant theoretical literature on price dispersion and hypotheses 
Our empirical approach builds on the existing theoretical literature on the nexus 
between pricing, competition, and search costs. There are numerous theoretical models 
trying to explain the impact of asymmetric consumer information, which arises from 
differing search and/or switching costs, on price dispersion.  Most relevant for our 
setting is a clearinghouse model developed by Stahl (1989), which is based on Varian’s 
(1980) model. We also refer to other theoretical works that generally build on these 
models. Besides, Janssen and Moraga-González (2004) develop a non-sequential fixed 
sample size search model that bears important implications for our empirical analysis. 
Stahl’s (1989) model assumes a fraction of consumers 𝜇𝜇 who have no search costs 
(“shoppers”) and thus are fully informed about the full price distribution in the market. 
These consumers have information about all available prices and buy from the cheapest 
supplier. The remaining share of consumers (1− 𝜇𝜇) pays a search cost for each price 
quotation and engage in sequential search until they obtain a price quotation that is 
below their endogenously determined reservation price.  
As opposed to Stahl (1989)’s model, where informed consumers are assumed to 
have zero search costs, in the electricity retail market informed consumers still have 
positive search costs. Nonetheless, the informed consumers obtain all available price 
quotes for their respective zip code from an online comparison website (i.e. a 
clearinghouse), which may severely lower their search costs compared to the 
uninformed consumers. Hence, the fraction of informed consumers who gather 
information from a clearinghouse will only buy at the lowest price.12 The other fraction 
of uninformed or brand loyal (see Baye et al., 2004) consumers will stay with their 
incumbent suppliers and purchase at higher prices. Consequently, we interpret 
consumers who collect price quotes from online search platforms as informed consumers 
(i.e. “shoppers”) as presented in Stahl’s model (𝜇𝜇).  
12 Similarly, Chandra and Tappata (2011) assume “shoppers” to access a clearinghouse and buy from the 
cheapest supplier, whereas the uninformed “nonshoppers” buy from random stores. 
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According to Stahl (1989), when consumers have asymmetric search costs 
(0 < 𝜇𝜇 < 1), price dispersion represents a Nash equilibrium because firms do not follow 
pure strategies but randomly draw from an equilibrium price distribution (i.e. mixed 
strategies).13 Barron et al. (2004, p. 1049) stress that all firms get the same expected 
profit form mixed strategies: “a low price reduces the returns from sales to the 
uninformed, but this is exactly offset by the increase in expected returns arising from 
the increased likelihood that the seller will be the lowest-priced seller, and thus sell to 
all of the informed consumers.” Moreover, there are two extreme cases, for which price 
dispersion vanishes. When all consumers are uninformed (𝜇𝜇 = 0), all firms charge 
monopoly prices (Diamond’s outcome). On the contrary, when all consumers are fully 
informed (𝜇𝜇 = 1), all firms charge Walrasian prices (Bertrand outcome).  
Stahl (1989) shows that as the proportion of informed consumers increases 
gradually from 𝜇𝜇 = 0 to 𝜇𝜇 = 1, the price distribution shifts downwards monotonically 
and the average price falls. Nevertheless, it is not clear-cut how the support of the price 
distribution behaves as 𝜇𝜇 shifts from zero to one. Stahl (1989) argues that as the 
number of “shoppers” increases, both the upper and the lower bounds of the support 
shift downward (see also Tang et al., 2010). This argument seems somewhat ad-hoc for 
the upper bound of the distribution, as expected prices may fall even though the upper 
bound of the distribution (i.e. the incumbent supplier’s price in our study) may stay 
unchanged or may even increase. 
In Stahl’s (1989) model, price dispersion follows an inverted U-shape with an 
increasing fraction of informed consumers between the two extreme cases of monopoly 
pricing and the Bertrand outcome for the following reasons (see also Baye et al., 2006). 
From the starting point of 𝜇𝜇 = 0, where all firms charge the same monopoly price, an 
increase in the fraction of informed consumers (𝜇𝜇) provides firms with an incentive to 
undercut prices in order to attract consumers who search for prices. As a result, price 
dispersion increases. Once 𝜇𝜇 reaches a certain threshold, more mass of the price support 
shifts downward and hence price dispersion starts to decline until it eventually 
converges to the Bertrand outcome. Pennersdorfer et al. (2014) underpin this statement 
by providing a mathematical proof. Chandra and Tappata (2011) provide an intuition 
for the behavior of price dispersion, as low gains from search arise for consumers when 
search intensity is either low or high, however, gains are higher when search intensity 
takes up an intermediate level. 
13 Varian (1980) provides the same finding. 
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Janssen and Moraga-González (2004) provide a non-sequential search model where 
search is endogenous to firm entry and where the fraction of uninformed consumers 
searches with differing intensity. Two counteracting forces are prevalent in the market: 
The business-stealing effect causes firms to charge low prices in order to attract 
informed consumers who engage in search. The surplus-appropriation effect lets firms 
charge high prices for the uninformed consumers who do not compare prices. Price 
dispersion may be an equilibrium result in this model as it may be beneficial for firms 
to either charge a high price for customers with medium or low search intensity or a 
low price for customers with high search intensity. Similarly, Chandra and Tappata 
(2011) postulate that, holding consumer information constant, an increase in the 
number of firms in the market brings about two effects. First, each firm loses parts of 
its uninformed consumers. Second, the probability of having the lowest price decreases 
exponentially. Both effects cause firms to set more extreme prices increasing price 
dispersion. Moreover, they show that price dispersion increases with higher competition 
at a decreasing rate. 
In our setting, the consumers willing to stay with their local incumbent suppliers at 
higher tariffs, as they do not engage in search, correspond well with Janssen and 
Moraga-González’s (2004) consumers with medium or low search intensity. On the 
other hand, the informed consumers of the cheapest entrant firms may represent the 
group of consumers with high search intensity.  
Janssen and Moraga-González (2004) show that when consumers search with high 
intensity, an increase in the number of firms causes prices to drop at a declining rate. 
The reason is that it may be beneficial for a firm to undercut prices since with a low 
number of firms in the market the business-stealing effect dominates the surplus-
appropriation effect. With a large number of firms, additional entry weakens the 
business-stealing effect and causes prices to fall less rapidly (and eventually increase). 
In other words, when the number of firms in the market is low, a firm may profit from 
charging the lowest price in order to attract the informed customers. Once there is a 
sufficiently large number of firms in the market, the probability of charging the lowest 
prices approaches zero and it may be worthwhile to charge higher prices and target the 
uninformed consumers. Consequently, our cheapest entrant’s price may descend due to 
competition at a decreasing rate (U-shape).  
On the contrary, when consumer search intensity is low, an increase in the number 
of firms in the market causes prices to first rise and then stagnate. “(…) When the 
number of firms in the market grows without limit, the probability that a firm is 
undercut by some other firm converges to 1. It is precisely for this reason that in the 
10 
 
limit economy firms set their prices ignoring the fully-informed consumers altogether 
and concentrating on attracting the less-informed consumers.” (Janssen and Moraga-
González, 2004, p. 1107). This implies that our local incumbent suppliers may increase 
their prices or stay put when competition in the market goes up. What is more, both 
price effects for the entrants and incumbents cause price dispersion to follow an 
inverted U-shape relation with the number of firms in the market.  
Morgan, Orzen, and Sefton (2006) support the results by Janssen and Moraga-
González: An increase in the number of firms leads to lower average prices for the 
informed consumers. On the contrary, more firms in the market lead to higher average 
prices for the uninformed consumers because firms’ incentives to undercut prices in 
order to attract “shoppers” vanish. 
In Table 1 we summarize the main predictions of the relevant theoretical literature 
on our main variables of interest, which we will test empirically. Due to the reasons 
given above, we expect price dispersion to be related to both consumer information and 
number of competitors in an inverted U-shape manner. 
For incumbent prices, the predictions on the initial effects of consumer information 
are not clear-cut. Incumbents may cater to the less informed consumers (surplus 
appropriation) or alternatively they may decrease prices if the upper bound of the price 
distribution also declines in response to more consumer search (business stealing). 
Which effect dominates is ultimately an empirical question. Eventually, i.e. with a lot 
of consumers searching in the market, we expect also incumbent prices to decline in 
response to additional consumer search. The predictions for the effects of consumer 
search on entrant's prices are more clear-cut. Entrants have to lure customers away 
from incumbents, thus they decrease prices in response to customer search, albeit at a 
decreasing rate. 
Applying the theory of Janssen and Moraga-Gonzales (2004) to our problem, the 
predictions on the effects of the number of competitors on (incumbent and entrant) 
prices are clear-cut, albeit in opposite directions. Incumbents operate in a low to middle 
search intensity equilibrium, and therefore are expected to increase prices in response 
to firm entry (at a decreasing rate). Entrants operate in a high-search intensity 
situation and have to decrease prices to attract informed consumers (at a decreasing 
rate).  
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Table 1: Predicted effects of main variables of interest on price dispersion and prices 
  Price dispersion  Price incumbent  Price entrant 
  Effect Reason  Effect Reason  Effect Reason 
Consumer 
information (μ) 
+ Mixed strategy; incentive for 
firms to undercut prices to 
attract searchers increases 
(Stahl, 1989) 
 –/0/+ Incumbents may cater to less informed 
consumers with lower elasticity of 
demand (surplus appropriation). In 
contrast, Stahl (1989) and Tang et al. 
(2010) predict the incumbent’s price 
(upper bound of the price distribution) 
to decline. 
 − Intensity of price competition 
goes up; demand shifts to lower-
priced firms (Stahl, 1989) 
Consumer 
information 
squared (μ2) 
− More mass of price support 
shifts downward; Extreme case, 
u=1, Bertrand outcome (Stahl, 
1989) 
 −/0 Eventually incumbent prices may 
stagnate or decrease to retain some 
demand (Stahl, 1989). 
 + Price approaches lower bound at 
marginal cost (Bertrand 
outcome, Stahl, 1989) 
Competitors 
(N) 
+ Decreased (increased) frequency 
to charge intermediate 
(extreme) prices; business 
stealing effect strengthened for 
entrants, surplus appropriation 
effect strengthened for 
incumbents (Janssen and 
Moraga-Gonzales, 2004) 
 + Surplus appropriation dominates 
business stealing effect; probability to be 
undercut converges to 1; incumbent 
concentrates on less-informed consumers 
(i.e. low to middle search intensity 
equilibrium; Janssen and Moraga-
Gonzales, 2004) 
 − Business stealing dominates 
surplus appropriation effect (i.e. 
high-search intensity equilibrium; 
Janssen and Moraga-Gonzales, 
2004) 
Competitors 
squared (N2) 
− Strengthening of the two effects 
(business stealing for entrants 
and surplus appropriation for 
incumbents) weakens with more 
firms (Janssen and Moraga-
Gonzales, 2004) 
  − As N approaches infinity, there is a price 
cealing, the monopoly price (Diamond 
outcome, Stahl, 1989) or firms 
randomize between marginal cost pricing 
and monopoly price (Janssen and 
Moraga-Gonzales, 2004) 
  + As N approaches infinity, the 
business stealing effect is 
weakened since the probability of 
having the lowest price 
approaches zero (Janssen and 
Moraga-Gonzales, 2004) 
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3. Background on Electricity Retail 
Almost 17 years have passed since European electricity markets were liberalized ending 
the former local monopoly regencies in electricity retail. In 2014, a German household 
could choose on average between 155 electricity retailers each providing 3.4 tariffs.  
Table 2 shows potential yearly savings (i.e. price dispersions) between the 
incumbent’s base tariff and the cheapest supplier for standard households. 
 
Table 2: Potential savings (€/year) from switching from the incumbent to 
the cheapest entrant at different household sizes 
  Obs Mean SD Min Max % of all HH 
1 P HH (2000 kw/year) 30,982 121.18 25.52 15.18 226.91 36.51 
2 P HH (3500 kw/year) 30,968 196.04 39.38 8.07 353.52 35.29 
4 P HH (5000 kw/year) 30,963 277.05 52.71 0.56 491.93 10.68 
Notes: “HH” stands for household. “Obs.” are zip code-year observations.  
 
Although switching the provider substantially helps the budget (see Table 2) only 
a small fraction of German households has taken advantage of it until today. However, 
the share of prospective switching customers used to grow in recent years (see Figure 
1) as online price comparison sites have significantly disburdened costs of searching 
cheaper providers, and customers can now easily switch the provider within the time 
period of a TV break.14 Nevertheless, 79% of German households were still supplied by 
their former local incumbent utility in 2014 even though switching to one of the 
alternative retailers – referred to as entrants hereinafter – would clearly generate 
substantial savings.15 In general there are three candidate explanations for these 
frictions in consumer switching, namely search costs, switching costs and brand effects. 
Since electricity is a homogenous product brand effects should not play a major role.16 
There is no reason to assume that the incumbent supplier is more secure in providing 
electricity since the incumbent has the legal obligation to guarantee a continuous 
14 According to a survey 80%  of the switchers searched online for alternative providers (A.T. Kearney, 
2012) 
15 See Monitoringreport (2014, p. 114) from the German Federal Cartel Office and the Federal Network 
Agency. 
16 Hortacsu et al. (2015) analyze the Texas residential electricity market between 2002 and 2006 and find 
a brand effect for the incumbent. However, they also point out that it diminishes over time due to 
consumers' learning. 
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provision of electricity to the customer.17 Even when an entrant goes bankrupt, the 
former incumbent has to back its customers with electricity supply at no additional 
fees.18 Nevertheless, not all consumers might be aware of this safety net. Switching 
costs are also not likely a candidate explanation since a) the switching process is an 
automated process and conducted by the provider a consumer opts for switching to19 
and b) the cancellation period for the incumbents’ base tariffs is only two weeks by 
law. Therefore, we consider search costs as the main source for observed differences in 
end-user prices. 
 
Figure 1: Development of supplier changes in electricity retail in Germany 
 
Note: Data are obtained from Bundesnetzagentur (2015). 
 
A comparison portal requires entering information on a customer’s expected 
consumption over one year. Because electricity tariffs are multi-part tariffs and 
electricity consumption depends on exogenous factors (for instance weather) this opens 
17 In this regard, Hortacsu et al. (2015) mention the possibility that customers may believe that the 
incumbent supplier may exhibit a higher supply security although this is in fact not true. 
18 Indeed, two of the bigger alternative providers went bankrupt in 2011 (Teldafax) and 2013 
(Flexstrom), respectively. 
19 The new supplier will automatically overtake all switching activities for its new customer, such as 
unsubscribing from the old supplier, registration, etc., at no switching fees. Giulietti et al. (2014) 
investigate the U.K. electricity retail market, where the switching process can be easily compared with 
Germany’s. They highlight that “Search is perceived by consumers as being significantly more difficult 
than switching.” (p. 561) 
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the possibility to over- or underestimate consumption and as a result the initial choice 
might not be the best choice (Waddams and Wilson, 2010). Furthermore, tariffs might 
include a switching bonus thereby making it only the cheapest tariff for the first year 
and without engaging in search again the tariff can be disadvantageous for the 
consumer after the first year. This tariff strategy relies on profits from automatic 
contract extension due to expected consumer inertia. Montgomery et al. (2004) argue 
that the use of price-comparison “shopbots” will persist on a rather low level, given the 
various cognitive costs of evaluating many alternatives. Nevertheless, online price 
comparison websites have been gaining substantial attention from potential switchers 
over time.  
4. Data and Empirical Model 
The novel and unique data provide a key feature of our paper, since we are able to 
empirically test the effects of both consumer search and competition on price dispersion 
(and prices) at the German zip code level for the period 2011–2014. It is of particular 
relevance that we are able to directly measure consumer search from our information 
about online search requests (i.e. clicks) for alternative tariffs at major price 
comparison portals. Besides having suitable measures for our dependent variables and 
variables of interest, we include a rich set of control variables. In section 4.1., we 
present descriptive statistics and information on the spatial distribution of some key 
variables. In section 4.2., we describe our estimation strategy for the econometric 
approach. 
 
4.1.Data and Variables 
Our data stems mainly from two sources. From ene’t, a German software and data 
provider for the electricity industry, we received detailed data on consumer search 
activities, retail electricity prices and cost components. The marketing company 
Acxiom provided data on structural household characteristics in Germany. Since the 
ene’t data are structured at the monthly frequency, we aggregate them to match with 
the Acxiom data, which are at the yearly level. This corresponds well with the length 
of a typical electricity contract. Our data span the period 2011–2014. The spatial data 
resolution is at the German zip code level. In total, the database contains 8,224 zip 
codes. This bears an advantage over other empirical papers, which have to make 
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assumptions about the delineation of local.20 Consumers can only choose among 
electricity tariffs from retailers that supply in their respective zip code. We first 
describe how we construct our main variables from the data and subsequently provide 
information on control variables. 
 
Price Dispersion 
Our measure for price dispersion (PD) represents the relevant price range, i.e. the 
difference between the incumbent’s price and the cheapest entrant tariff.21 We define 
the incumbent’s price as the upper bound as even if there were more expensive entrants 
consumers would not consider them as alternatives. The cheapest price describes the 
lower bound as in general a provider mostly attracts consumers when it has the lowest 
price in the market.22 Prices are measured as end-user tariffs including the fee for the 
electricity itself, grid charges and other charges, and taxes including the value added 
tax. The price data are at the zip code level. They are observed on a due date each 
month and subsequently transformed into yearly averages.  
Since we have knowledge on the cost components of electricity supply (described 
later) we also compute markups and Lerner indices. Markups are calculated 
considering all known spatially varying costs such as fixed and variable grid charge 
components and concession fees as well as spatially constant but time varying costs, 
such as the renewable energy surcharge.23 These data are described in greater detail 
below. We also utilize the day-ahead spot price (Phelix base) at the European Power 
Exchange (EPEX)24 in order to approximate the costs of purchasing wholesale 
electricity. Even if electricity is purchased otherwise (e.g. through direct contracts, 
OTC markets, forward contracts, etc.) or generated by vertically integrated power 
plants, the spot price represents the opportunity cost of purchasing electricity. The cost 
components we observe (abstracting from heterogeneous advertising and hedging 
strategies etc.) do not differ between incumbents and entrants and thus the difference 
in markups between incumbents and entrants is the price dispersion plus the difference 
20 For example, in Gasoline retail Pennerstorfer et al. (2014) make assumptions about the search radius 
of consumers. 
21 The price range is a common measure for dispersion (see, e.g., Chandra and Tappata, 2011; 
Pennersdorfer et al. 2015). An alternative is the variation in prices, which is not available to us since we 
only observe the tariffs of the incumbent and cheapest entrant each month. 
22 An exemption may be the fraction of consumers who are willing to switch to a green power supplier at 
a higher tariff. 
23 In German “EEG Umlage”. 
24 EPEX represents the relevant power exchange for Germany. 
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in value added tax due to the higher prices charged by the incumbent.25 Accordingly, 
the Lerner Index represents the ratio of the markup to the price. 
 
Consumer Information 
We are interested in the impact of consumer information on actual prices and on 
price dispersion. The direct measure for consumer information is constructed from 
individual search queries provided by ene’t. The data contain detailed information on 
individual search patterns enabling us to construct a dataset on regional consumer 
search intensity. The sample period ranges from March 2011 to December 2014. The 
database covers all search activities conducted on several well-known online price 
comparison platforms including Toptarif.de (top tariff), Stromtipp.de (power tip), 
Energieverbraucherportal.de (energy consumption portal) and mut-zum-wechseln.de 
(courage-to-change), of which Toptarif.de is the biggest platform by far.26 For each 
query we observe the timestamp of the search request, the zip code for which the 
offered electricity tariffs are requested, the (expected) yearly consumption entered into 
the search mask, the type of search request (household or industrial customer) as well 
as a search session ID indicating the order of the queries of the respective searchers. In 
sum, we have information on 35,855,071 search requests from 17,302,530 search sessions 
of which 96.7% (i.e. 16,778,214 sessions) are conducted by households and the 
remaining 3.3% (i.e. 524,316 sessions) by industrial customers.  
In our analysis we will focus on household consumers. The main application is 
conducted on a typical two person household with a consumption of 3,500 kWh per 
year, which represents 35% of all households.27 We are not able to observe actual 
switching, because clicking on a certain supplier’s tariff at the online comparison 
website redirects the searcher to a website where the switch can be finalized. This 
limitation is common to online data (see Koulayev, 2014). Yet, switching requires 
searching, so the impact of consumer search on price strategies seems to be consistently 
estimable.28  
25 There are in some cases also additional but rather small deviations between the incumbents’ and the 
entrants’ costs resulting from slightly different costs for metering services. 
26 Toptarif is one of the three big electricity and gas price comparison websites along with Verivox and 
Check24. It was acquired by Verivox in July 2014 but continues to operate as Toptarif.  
27 Our findings are fully robust to the estimations for different household sizes (i.e. different consumption 
levels). We provide these results upon request. 
28 Brynjolsson and Smith (2001) confirm this and find that factors that drive clicks are reasonable and 
relatively unbiased indicators of sales in their study on online book purchases 
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On this basis we construct a measure of consumer information as follows. Because 
many searchers conduct several search requests within a search session (e.g. comparing 
prices for different levels of consumptions) we only count the number of search sessions 
and refer to a consumer conducting a search session as being fully informed regardless 
of the depth of the search activity.29 Furthermore, we exclude 551,256 search sessions 
which exclusively consider eco-label certified tariffs. Those searches are most likely not 
predominantly price but rather ideology related and on average 152 Euro more 
expensive than the cheapest tariff.30 We then compute our measure of consumer search 
𝜇𝜇 by aggregating the search sessions within a zip code on a yearly basis and 
subsequently divide this value by the number of households within the zip code in the 
respective year. Since we observe some extreme outliers in some zip codes, apparently 
resulting from price comparing software “bots” or data crawling researchers, we 
truncate 2% of the upper bound of the sample distribution of our measure of consumer 
information.31 
 
Competition 
To measure spatial competition we use the number of electricity retail suppliers 
within a zip code. The number of competitors in a zip code varies between 55 and 198 
in our observation period. These data were also provided by ene’t. 
 
Control Variables 
Data on costs are obtained from ene’t. We distinguish between three cost factors 
with spatial variation, namely (i) fixed grid charges, (ii) variable grid charges, and (iii) 
concession fees.32 Fixed and variable grid charges are paid by the electricity provider to 
the respective system operator and, thus, vary across grid areas (i.e. clusters of zip 
codes). The concession fee has to be paid by the system operator to the respective zip 
code (i.e. zip code) for the right to install and operate electric cables on public roads. 
29 It should also be noted that a search session only contains the current search activity of an individual 
household and we cannot distinguish whether the same household starts a new search session on another 
day. Therefore, we treat each search session as conducted by an individual household. 
30 Nevertheless, our results are fully robust to the inclusion of eco label searches. 
31 Figure 4 in the Appendix provides a histogram on consumer information before and after the data 
trimming. Figure 5 and Figure 6 provide histograms on the distribution of the number of competitors 
and price dispersion. 
32 In the regressions, we cannot include other costs, which only vary with time but not across firms (e.g. 
wholesale spot price as a proxy for the purchase price of electricity), because these are captured by year 
fixed effects. 
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Hence, the concession fees vary at the zip code level. All of these cost components 
represent parts of the annual electricity bill. 
Other control variables refer to structural household characteristics which we 
received from Acxiom. These data include the (i) average household size, (ii) the share 
of job seekers, and (iii) income brackets (which may control for consumers’ sensitivity 
to prices and thus impact a household’s likelihood to search). 
 
Identification 
We are aware of a likely reverse causality (i.e. the problem of endogeneity) between 
prices and both a) consumer information and b) the number of competitors.33 There is 
also likely an effect of prices (and thus also price dispersion) on consumer search 
because consumers increase search efforts when their electricity bill is high34 and price 
dispersion enables consumers to reduce their expenditures (thus increasing their gains 
from search). As regards b), the levels of prices and price dispersion may also affect 
entry decisions. For example, high prices may attract new entrants. 
We circumvent the endogeneity issue by applying instrumental variable techniques. 
We employ the following instruments for consumer information: (1) the share of 
households with a household head below the age of 40 (U40), (2) the share of 
households that moved into the zip code (New HH), and (3) the share of households 
that moved away from the zip code (Moved HH). We instrument for competition with 
(4) the number of households in the zip code (# HH). The reason why we believe these 
measures to be adequate instruments are as follows: 
With respect to U40, the assumption is that younger people are more familiar with 
the internet and thus have lower burdens to gather information online at price 
comparison websites. Under this assumption the share of U40 households will 
exogenously shift average search intensity in the respective zip code (but not prices or 
price dispersion). With respect to New HH, we emphasize that new households receive 
information on their electricity contract from their base supplier (the former 
33 In this study, we do not look at a potential relation between search intensity and the number of firms, 
but employ instrumental variable techniques. According to Janssen and Moraga-González (2004), search 
intensity depends on the number of firms in an intricate way. However, as the number of firms is always 
above 50 and also consumers have no information about the exact number of firms in the market in the 
absence of searching we argue that consumers’ search intensity is unaffected by the number of firms in 
their local market. 
34 See also Hortacsu et al. (2015) who point to higher switching rates in the summer month as a reaction 
of consumers to high electricity bills from air conditioning. 
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incumbent), which confronts them with their contracts’ monetary conditions and thus 
increases the likelihood to search for alternative tariffs.35 Regarding Moved HH, we 
postulate that since moves away from a zip code are not predominantly spontaneous, a 
household is not likely to search for a new energy contract in the year it moves away. 
The number of households within the respective zip code represents a measure of 
market size, which we expect to exogenously impact competition. A larger market 
promises more potential customers and, as a result, has an influence on competition.36 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics of our variables employed in the regressions. 
Graphical illustrations of the spatial distribution of consumer search intensity, the 
number of competitors and price dispersion are made available in Figure 7 to Figure 9 
in the Appendix. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 Indeed, a disproportionally high share of switchers are new households (Monitoring Report, 2014). 
36 We see no reason to assume that the number of households has an influence on prices through the 
presence of economies of scale in retail electricity. This is for the reason that electricity trading 
represents the main task of electricity retailers, which does not exhibit economies of scale – as opposed to 
other electricity sectors, such as power generation or transmission. 
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Table 3: Summary statistics 
  Mean S.D. Min Max Obs. 
Price and Price Dispersion 
Price dispersion (€/a) 196.04 39.38 8.07 353.52 30,968 
Price incumbent (€/a) 1003.79 77.90 761.01 1204.15 30,968 
Price entrant (€/a) 807.75 58.74 657.19 903.03 30,968 
Information and Number of Competitors 
% Informed households (μ) 9.28 6.46 0.00 36.06 30,968 
# Competitors (N) 132.33 24.63 54.58 198.00 30,968 
Markups           
Markup dispersion (€/a) 164.89 33.28 3.38 297.07 30,968 
Markup incumbent (€/a) 162.84 40.94 -72.37 299.24 30,968 
Markup entrant (€/a) -2.04 22.60 -118.60 67.22 30,968 
Lerner Index 
Lerner index dispersion (€/a) 0.164 0.028 0.006 0.345 30,968 
Lerner index incumbent (€/a) 0.161 0.034 -0.095 0.271 30,968 
Lerner index entrant (€/a) -0.003 0.029 -0.179 0.086 30,968 
Costs 
Variable grid charge (€ cent/kw) 5.32 0.88 1.57 8.67 30,968 
Fixed grid charge (€/a) 16.14 11.43 0.00 75.00 30,968 
Concession fee (€ cent/kw) 1.49 0.35 0.00 2.39 30,968 
Phelix Spot Price (€/MW) 44.40 6.69 35.89 54.03 30,968 
Instruments 
% Moved households 24.60 5.00 7.70 55.00 30,968 
% New households 5.60 2.10 0.70 79.00 30,968 
% Head of household under the age of 40  5.50 2.00 1.20 79.50 30,968 
#  Households 5,025 4,666 16 29,891 30,968 
Household characteristics 
% Job seekers 5.50 3.60 0.00 24.50 30,968 
% Household head with income < 25 th. €/a 39.20 7.50 2.40 83.00 30,968 
% Household head with income 25–50 th. €/a 32.20 2.50 9.90 59.10 30,968 
Average household size (persons) 2.11 0.18 1.52 2.55 30,968 
Notes: “Obs” are zip code-year observations. Negative markups and Lerner indices may occur 
since (cheapest) entrants pay a switching bonus and therefore may condone losses in the first 
year. 
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5. Econometric Model 
We aim at estimating the impact of consumer search intensity as well as the degree 
of competition on price and price dispersion. Due to the above discussed endogenous 
relation between dispersion and consumer search we apply instrumental variable 
techniques. The two first-stage equations we estimate are as follows: 
 
𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁_ℎℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜗𝜗11𝑈𝑈40𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜗𝜗21𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜗𝜗31𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃1 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖1 + 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  (1) 
 
and 
 
𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁_ℎℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜗𝜗12𝑈𝑈40𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜗𝜗22𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜗𝜗32𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃2 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖2 + 𝜌𝜌𝑗𝑗2 + 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2  (2) 
 
The subscripts i, j and t indicate zip codes, supply areas of the incumbents, and 
years, respectively. Our dependent variables, the measure for consumer search intensity 
(𝜇𝜇) and the number of competitors (𝑁𝑁), are linear projections of the instruments 
Num_hh, which is the number of households within a zip code, 𝑈𝑈40, which is the share 
of households with the head of the household being under the age of 40, New, which 
represents the share of households that moved into the respective zip code, and Move, 
which represents the share of households that moved away. 𝑋𝑋 is a vector of all control 
variables as described above. In our preferred regression we also add regional fixed 
effects for the 777 incumbents (𝜌𝜌𝑗𝑗 ). The reason for including incumbent fixed effects 
instead of zip code fixed effects is that an incumbent generally operates in multiple zip 
codes and also the number of competitors rather varies on distribution grid areas 
(generally the incumbents supply area).37 Finally, year dummies (𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 ) capture 
unobserved time varying components. 
Besides the terms in levels, we create instruments for the squared terms of 
consumer information (𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 ) and the number of suppliers (𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 )  in order to allow for non-
linear relations in the structural model. The instruments are the squared predictions of 
the first stages for 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, respectively, from equations 1 and 2: ?̂?𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2  instruments for 
𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2  and 𝑁𝑁�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2  for 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 .38 
 
 
 
37 As there are 8,224 zip codes the average incumbent operates in 10.6 zip codes.  
38 See Wooldridge (2010, p. 262) on this approach. 
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Thus, the structural equation we estimate takes the following form: 
 
 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1?̂?𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2?̂?𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑁𝑁�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑁𝑁�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃3 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖3 + 𝜌𝜌𝑗𝑗3 + 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3.   (3) 
  
where y denotes price dispersion, price incumbent, and price cheapest entrant, 
respectively. In alternative specifications, y may alternatively indicate markups or 
Lerner indices. 
 
6. Results on Price Dispersion and Prices of Incumbents and 
Entrants 
In this section we discuss the empirical results. Table 4 shows the estimates for 
Price Dispersion (PD). Furthermore, Table 5 and Table 6 contain regression estimates 
of incumbents’ and the entrants’ prices, respectively. In all tables we report reduced 
form and IV estimates with and without fixed effects (FE). In the case of IV 
regressions the respective test statistics suggest our instruments to work properly (in 
the fixed effects models). The instruments are sufficiently strong and the model is 
identified as a whole as shown by the high Kleibergen-Paap statistics.39 Also, the 
Hansen J test indicates that the instruments are valid as they are orthogonal to the 
errors.40 As the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test supports the endogeneity assumption by 
rejecting the null hypothesis of consumer search and the number of competitors being 
exogenous variables, the IV estimations with fixed effects (IV FE) are, thus, our 
preferred specifications over non-IV OLS and FE results.  
The regression results strongly support the hypothesis of an inverted U-shaped 
impact of consumer search on price dispersion, as ?̂?𝜇 is positively significant and ?̂?𝜇2 is 
39 The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic (2006) is the multivariate analogue of the first stage F-test. 
In case of multiple endogenous variables the Kleibergen-Paap statistic indicates whether the employed 
instruments do not only identify the endogenous variables individually in the corresponding first stage 
regressions (as the Angrist-Pischke first stage F-statistic does ), but also whether the endogenous 
variables are simultaneously identified. This is not necessarily the case, for example, when the 
instruments are highly correlated. In this circumstance, the same instruments would separately identify 
each endogenous regressor but the equation as a whole would not be identified. Indeed, in the case of 
only a single endogenous variable the Kleibergen-Paap statistic is identical to the standard first stage F-
statistic. The null hypothesis of the Kleibergen-Paap test is that the structural equation is under-
identified (that is, the rank condition fails). Even though critical values do not exist for the Kleibergen-
Paap statistic, the critical values calculated by Stock and Yogo (2005) are generally applied. As a rule of 
thumb a value of the test statistic above ten indicates identification of the model. 
40 First stage regressions are reported in Table 7 in the Appendix. 
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negatively significant.41 This result underpins Stahl’s (1989) theoretical finding that as 
𝜇𝜇 varies between zero (Diamond Outcome) and one (Bertrand outcome), price 
dispersion increases first and then declines. 
Moreover, we also find an inverted U-shape relation between price dispersion and 
competition (𝑁𝑁� is positive and significant, 𝑁𝑁2�  is negative and significant). Interestingly, 
Tables 4 and 5 indicate that price dispersion is caused by contrasting pricing strategies 
of the incumbent and the entrant rather than by different intensities of the same 
strategies.  
The incumbents’ pricing reaction to increased consumer search is best described as 
inverse U-shaped – an initial increase in price is followed by a decrease after a certain 
degree of consumer information is achieved – presumably because the surplus 
appropriation effect initially outweighs the business stealing effect due to the much 
larger share of uninformed consumers of the incumbent.42 This finding contradicts 
Stahl’s (1989) theoretical argument that an increase in 𝜇𝜇 shifts also initially the upper 
bound of the price support downwards.  
The contrary is true for the group of entrants. Their pricing strategy with respect 
to consumer information follows a U-shape since the business stealing effect clearly 
outplays the surplus appropriation effect as all consumers are with the incumbent to 
begin with when there are no informed consumers. The more consumers get informed, 
the higher the market shares of the entrants (due to switching). However, it may be 
that as not all consumers continue to stay informed (i.e. after having switched to the 
cheapest provider at a certain time they have a high probability to stay there 
regardless of whether there are cheaper providers after some time), there is also a 
surplus appropriation effect for the entrants when more consumers get informed. 
With regard to the impact of the degree of competition on pricing we observe 
similar patterns. Price dispersion follows an inverse U-shape with additional firms in 
the market. This empirical results corresponds well with theoretical findings by Janssen 
and Moraga-Gonzales (2004). The underlying price setting behavior of entrants and 
incumbents is as follows. 
41 We also apply the method recently developed by Lind and Mehlum (2010) in order to test whether the 
estimated relationships are actually non-monotonic within the observed data spectrum.  
42 Recall that the incumbent has by far the largest market share since all consumers are initially assigned 
to the incumbent. Thus, switching requires search efforts and all consumers that are still with the 
incumbent may be viewed as uninformed. See Janssen and Moraga-Gonzales (2004) on business stealing 
and surplus appropriation effects.  
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As the number of firms increases, the entrants react with price decreases at a 
decreasing rate. The intuition behind this finding is that entrants try to undercut their 
competitors in order to expand their market shares. In this case, the business stealing 
effect outweighs the surplus appropriation effect. Moreover, with more and more firms 
in the market, the likelihood of charging the lowest tariff approaches zero. Hence, firm 
entry weakens the business stealing effect causing prices of entrants to fall less rapidly 
and eventually to increase.  
On the other hand, the incumbent suppliers react with price increases at a 
decreasing rate due to intensified competition in the market. In this case, the surplus 
appropriation effect offsets the business stealing effect when 𝑁𝑁 increases. The 
incumbent concentrates on its less-informed customers and charges a higher price as its 
incentives to undercut entrant prices to attract informed consumers disappears, since 
its probability of being undercut approaches one. 
For our results we reach the conclusion that the general assumption in the 
theoretical and empirical literature of an equal endowment of informed (and 
uninformed) consumers across firms is inappropriate. We show that price setting differs 
across firms, as incumbents and entrants react differently to consumer information and 
competition, given their heterogeneous proportions of “shoppers” and “non-shoppers”. 
As a consequence, opposed pricing strategies emerge for firms that are associated with 
uninformed consumers who are not willing to search for cheaper tariffs (i.e. 
incumbents) compared to firms associated with informed consumers who engage in 
search (i.e. entrants).  
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Table 4: Price Dispersion (PD) estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS FE IV IV FE 
Information (𝜇𝜇) 435.383*** 62.841*** 1078.341*** 736.278*** 
 (13.812) (7.045) (109.785) (80.865) 
     
Information2  -1088.574*** -167.267*** -2977.277*** -2046.275*** 
 (38.815) (18.942) (290.151) (213.607) 
     
#Competitors (𝑁𝑁) 2.026*** 1.160*** 0.865*** 3.287*** 
 (0.088) (0.056) (0.284) (0.358) 
     
#Competitors2 -0.007*** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.009*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Fixed Effects NO YES NO YES 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Extreme point (Inf.) 0.200 0.188 0.181 0.180 
Inverse U-shape test (Inf.) 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.000 
Extreme point (Comp.) 138.633 191.417 80.307 178.102 
Inverse U-shape test (Comp.) 0.000 0.029 0.071 0.001 
Kleibergen Paap F Stat. - - 85.879 56.582 
Hansen J stat. (p-val.) - - 0.000 0.935 
Wu-Hausman Test (p-val.) - - 0.000 0.000 
Adj. R2 0.262 0.431 - - 
#Obs. 30,968 30,968 30,968 30,968 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimation of IV models is by IV GMM. 
Instruments for 𝜇𝜇 and 𝑁𝑁 are the share of new households, the share of moved households, the 
share of households where the head is below the age of 40 and the number of households in a 
zip code. The additional instruments for 𝜇𝜇2 and 𝑁𝑁2 are the squares of their respective first 
stage predictions from equations (1) and (2). All estimations include control variables for 
regionally varying costs, household characteristics such as income and average household size 
(persons) as well as year dummies. Significant for * p < 0.1,** p < 0.05,*** p < 0.01. 
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Table 5: Price estimates for the incumbent 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS FE IV IV FE 
Information 447.602*** 53.800*** 957.849*** 322.813*** 
 (12.836) (5.614) (106.646) (60.993) 
     
Information2 -1088.929*** -112.360*** -2375.961*** -734.000*** 
 (37.290) (14.755) (280.656) (161.437) 
     
#Competitors 1.830*** 0.923*** 0.184 2.039*** 
 (0.080) (0.046) (0.267) (0.259) 
     
#Competitors2 -0.007*** -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Fixed Effects NO YES NO YES 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Extreme point (Inf.) 0.206 0.239 0.202 0.220 
Inverse U-shape test (Inf.) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Extreme point (Comp.) 136.236 184.870 25.567 174.491 
Inverse U-shape test (Comp.) 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.001 
Kleibergen Paap F Stat. - - 85.879 56.582 
Hansen J stat. (p-val.) - - 0.025 0.309 
Wu-Hausman test (p-val.) - - 0.000 0.000 
Adj. R2 0.831 0.962 - - 
#Obs. 30,968 30,968 30,968 30,968 
Note: Description as in Table 4. 
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Table 6: Price estimates for the entrant 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS FE IV IV FE 
Information 12.219*** -9.040** -112.127*** -416.885*** 
 (4.255) (4.195) (35.907) (43.997) 
     
Information2 -0.355 54.907*** 577.612*** 1319.628*** 
 (11.427) (11.118) (95.099) (115.958) 
     
#Competitors -0.197*** -0.236*** -0.752*** -1.241*** 
 (0.030) (0.036) (0.100) (0.202) 
     
#Competitors2 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Fixed Effects NO YES NO YES 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Extreme point (Inf.) 17.221 0.082 0.097 0.158 
U-shape test (Inf.) 1.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Extreme point (Comp.) 165.762 222.133 184.792 183.431 
U-shape test (Comp.) 0.000 1.000 0.115 0.059 
Kleibergen Paap F Stat. - - 85.879 56.582 
Hansen J stat. (p-val.) - - 0.000 0.415 
Wu-Hausman test (p-val.) - - 0.000 0.003 
Adj. R2 0.969 0.973 - - 
#Obs. 30,968 30,968 30,968 30,968 
Note: Description as in Table 4. 
 
Figure 2 provides a graphical illustration of the effects of both consumer search and 
competition on price dispersion, prices of incumbents, and prices of entrants according 
to the IV FE estimates. 
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Figure 2: Impact of Search intensity and competitors on price dispersion 
and prices.  
 
Note: Curves represent estimates from columns 4 in Table 4 to Table 6 (IV with Fixed 
Effects). The image does not allow inference on the actual price and price dispersion levels as 
the constant is not estimated due to fixed effects. 
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Robustness 
Even though we believe that the chosen modelling approach reflects the market 
best (also indicated by the highest degree of variance explanation by the instruments) 
our results are surprisingly robust to a variety of specifications. The main results 
remain largely unchanged regardless whether we change from incumbent fixed effects to 
zip code fixed effects. In addition, the findings stay robust if we apply as alternative 
dependent variables the markup dispersion or the Lerner index dispersion (reported in 
Table 8 – Table 13 in the Appendix). Also, the results are valid for other household 
sizes (i.e. other consumption levels) like one-, three-, and four-person households and 
different fixed effect specifications, i.e. zip code level.43  
Moreover, the estimates are also confirmed in a semi-parametric context. With 
semi-parametric estimation, we allow for more flexible functional forms with regards to 
consumer search and the number of competitors. We apply Yatchew’s (1997, 1998) 
differencing based semiparametric partial linear method.44 Search intensity and number 
of competitors, respectively, are estimated non-parametrically by a local weighted 
scatterplot smoothing function (LOWESS) while the control variables from equations 3 
enter the model linearly. We also include control functions, i.e. first stage residuals 
from equations 1 (𝑁𝑁�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1) and 2 (𝑁𝑁�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2), respectively, in order to consider the endogeneity 
issue (two-stage residual inclusion, 2SRI).45  
The corresponding model specifications are  
 
 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼01 + 𝑓𝑓(𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛼𝛼11𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼21𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 +𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃4 + 𝛼𝛼31𝑁𝑁�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 + 𝛼𝛼41𝑁𝑁�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2                          + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖4 + 𝜌𝜌𝑗𝑗4 + 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 (4) 
 
and 
 
 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼02 + 𝑓𝑓(𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛼𝛼12𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼22𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃5 + 𝛼𝛼32𝑁𝑁� 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 + 𝛼𝛼42𝑁𝑁�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2                            + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖5 + 𝜌𝜌𝑗𝑗5 + 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 (5) 
 
43 Results are available from the authors upon request. 
44 Semiparametric estimators tend to be noisy in sparse regions and we therefore trim the data slightly 
by cutting the highest and lowest three per cent of the observations for search intensity and number of 
competitors, respectively, in the respective specifications. 
45 See Blundel and Powell (2004) or Wooldridge and Imbens (2007) on endogeneity in semiparametric 
models. 
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We start the description of the semiparametric estimates with the findings for the 
impact of consumer search. With regard to price dispersion, the parametric estimates 
are particularly confirmed as the shape of the non-parametrically estimated search 
function strongly suggests an inverted U-shaped impact of search intensity on price 
dispersion. Also, the entrants’ price adjustments follow a U-shape when search 
intensity increases. The non-parametrically estimated pricing patterns of the 
incumbents somehow confirm the parametric estimates, except for low levels of 𝜇𝜇 
(below 5% consumer information).  
Turning to the impact of the number of competitors on prices and price dispersion 
the results particularly confirm the parametric results. Price dispersion increases at a 
decreasing rate when the number of competitors gets higher and the same is true for 
the incumbents’ prices. Entrants decrease their prices as a reaction to increased 
competition. However, with about 120 competitors in the market, the effect becomes 
less pronounced. 
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Figure 3: Non-parametric fit from semiparametric estimates. Yatchew’s 
(1997) method.  
 
Note: Above figure illustrates the non-parametrically estimated functions of search intensity 
(left panel) and number of competitors (right panel) from a semiparametric partial linear model 
as suggested by Yatchew (1998). Nonparametric part estimated by a local polynomial function 
(LOWESS).  Differencing is of order 10. Endogeneity considered through the inclusion of 
control functions in the parametric part. Fixed Effects models. 
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7. Conclusion 
In this paper we investigate pricing strategies of local incumbents and entrants 
with respect to consumer information and competition in Germany’s electricity retail 
market. Standard economic theory suggests that prices for a homogenous good, such as 
electricity, should converge to “the law of one price”, as consumers may always switch 
to the cheapest tariff.  Nonetheless, despite the market liberalization 17 years ago, 
switching rates are low and price dispersion has been persistent. A great share of 
customers stays with the former monopoly supplier at a relatively high tariff. For a 
typical two-person household with a yearly consumption level of 3,500 kWh the 
average incumbent supplier charges EUR 1,004 while the cheapest entrant charges on 
average EUR 808, implying a relatively large mean price dispersion of EUR 196 or 
almost 20%. 
We stress that significant search frictions (see Stigler, 1961) are present in the 
market. This is even true despite the recent development of online search platforms, 
which are likely to have significantly lowered search costs for consumers. Obfuscation 
due to in transparent tariffs might be a potential explanation (Ellison and Ellison, 
2009). A online comparison portal provides consumers with all available electricity 
retail tariffs in his/her zip code and, thus, serves as a clearinghouse. We therefore 
follow the relevant theoretical literature of non-sequential fixed sample search models 
in a clearinghouse environment, to derive hypotheses of how both consumer 
information and competition influence price dispersion. 
In this study, we provide several novelties compared to the existing literature and, 
therefore, extend our knowledge on the nexus between search frictions, competition and 
pricing behavior in homogenous goods markets. (1) From our data we are able to 
construct a direct measure of consumer information that is rarely observable to 
researchers. (2) We infer about firm heterogeneity with respect to consumer 
information, since we distinguish incumbents, which are bound to “non-shoppers” who 
do not search for alternative tariffs, from entrants, which attract “shoppers” who 
engage in search. (3) We measure consumer information, competition and the tariffs of 
the cheapest entrant and the local incumbent in each German zip code for the annual 
period 2011–2014. This allows for inference about a very large sample of 8,224 
individual markets (i.e. zip codes) over 4 years. (4) For us market delineation is not an 
issue as in other studies, where assumptions have to be made about relevant markets. 
(5) We derive empirical results for the effects of both consumer search and competition 
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on prices and price dispersion altogether. Hence, we provide a fuller picture on the 
intricate relations. 
The empirical results correspond surprisingly well with hypotheses from the 
theoretical literature. We estimate an inverse U-shape effect of consumer information 
on price dispersion, as in Stahl (1989). That is, an increase in consumer information 
leads to an increase in the incumbent’s price at a decreasing rate (inverse U-shape), 
while the entrant’s price declines at a decreasing rate (U-shape). Moreover, price 
dispersion follows an inverted U-shape when competition in the market increases. This 
is in line with theoretical findings by Janssen and Moraga-González (2004). The inverse 
U-shape effect of competition on price dispersion, again, stems from opposing pricing 
reactions of incumbents and entrants. Incumbents tend to increase their prices at a 
decreasing rate when competition intensifies. On the other hand, entrants’ prices drop 
at a decreasing rate with additional firms in the market. 
A variety of empirical tests support the validity of our results. Initially, we 
truncate the 4% search request for tariffs with eco labels to avoid product 
differentiation effects. Including these requests does not alter the findings. Also, we 
estimate the models for different household sizes (e.g. 1-, 3-, and 4-person households) 
at different consumption levels and yield robust estimates. Our results are generally 
unchanged regardless whether we include incumbent (or distribution grid) fixed effects 
or zip code fixed effects. Changing the dependent variables from price dispersion to 
markup dispersion or Lerner index dispersion reaches similar conclusions. Besides, we 
allow for flexible functional forms of consumer search and competition by semi-
parametric estimation and find supportive evidence for our parametric estimates. Last 
but not least, our results stay valid when we apply the estimations on monthly level. 
Our results show that the assumption of equal shares of informed versus 
uninformed consumers across firms – as generally assumed in the theoretical and 
empirical literature – is not necessarily tenable and – if relaxed – substantially changes 
results. Price setting strategies may not only differ across firms, e.g. incumbents versus 
entrants, but can even be opposed according to their "endowment" of informed and 
uninformed consumers. That is, incumbent firms, which are associated with non-
shoppers who do not search for alternative tariffs, follow different pricing strategies 
with respect to consumer information and competition, compared to entrants, which 
generally attract “shoppers” who engage in search. Hence it may be either beneficial to 
raise prices in order to extract rents of consumers who exhibit high search costs 
(“surplus appropriation”), or conversely, to enlarge market shares by lowering prices to 
attract shoppers with low search costs (“business stealing”). These two forces 
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eventually cause price dispersion as long as there is heterogeneity in consumer search 
behavior, so that neither everyone is a “shopper” nor that everyone is a “non-shopper” 
(i.e. 0<𝜇𝜇<1).  
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Appendix 
Figure 4: Distribution of consumer search intensity before and after 
dropping the highest 2% of the observations. 
 
Figure 5: Distribution of number of competitors 
 
Figure 6: Distribution of price dispersion 
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Figure 7: Spatial distribution of price dispersion (2014) 
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Figure 8: Spatial distribution of search intensity (2014) 
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Figure 9: Spatial distribution of electricity retailers (2014) 
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Table 7: First-stage regressions of equations 1 and 2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Information Information #Competito
rs 
#Competitors 
New HH 0.006 0.035 -140.121*** -92.721** 
 (0.035) (0.037) (12.552) (41.252) 
     
Moved HH -0.125*** -0.111*** 42.874*** 47.229* 
 (0.033) (0.036) (10.654) (24.376) 
     
Head of HH below age of 40  0.045*** 0.038* 66.550*** 13.223 
(0.007) (0.021) (2.248) (14.750) 
     
#Households -0.029*** -0.052* 12.584*** -4.867 
 (0.004) (0.028) (1.426) (5.906) 
     
Average HH size 0.048*** 0.045*** 27.361*** 20.660*** 
 (0.003) (0.009) (0.800) (7.036) 
     
Income < 25k Euro/year -0.029*** -0.052* 12.584*** -4.867 
(0.004) (0.028) (1.426) (5.906) 
     
Income 25-50k Euro/year 0.021** 0.001 -39.541*** -20.346 
(0.011) (0.034) (3.120) (13.148) 
     
Grid Charge (Variable Part) 0.006*** 0.005** 4.406*** -0.893** 
(0.000) (0.003) (0.118) (0.430) 
     
Grid Charge (Fixed Part) 0.000*** 0.000 0.086*** 0.108 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.096) 
     
Concession Fee 0.013*** 0.002 0.629 2.433 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.452) (1.791) 
Fixes Effects NO YES NO YES 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES 
First-stage F test 219.26 214.59 193.27 70.84 
R2 0.583 0.592 0.671 0.835 
#Obs. 30968 30968 30968 30968 
Constant term and year dummies not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
significant for * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The first-stage F test is the Angrist-
Pischke F-test for the excluded instruments. Instruments in italics. 
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Table 8: Markup Dispersion Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS FE IV IV FE 
Information (𝜇𝜇) 368.179*** 59.456*** 928.974*** 587.085*** 
 (11.716) (6.030) (93.819) (69.763) 
     
Information2  -922.534*** -157.194*** -2555.076*** -1633.464*** 
 (32.908) (16.177) (247.805) (183.957) 
     
#Competitors (𝑁𝑁) 1.677*** 0.922*** 0.580** 2.787*** 
 (0.075) (0.058) (0.242) (0.304) 
     
#Competitors2 -0.006*** -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.008*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
#Obs. 30,968 30,968 30,968 30,968 
Note: Description as in Table 4. 
 
Table 9: Markup Incumbent Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS FE IV IV FE 
Information (𝜇𝜇) 374.803*** 45.948*** 837.476*** 245.476*** 
 (10.824) (4.721) (90.883) (50.768) 
     
Information2  -913.770*** -96.764*** -2099.244*** -555.553*** 
 (31.446) (12.334) (239.456) (134.572) 
     
#Competitors (𝑁𝑁) 1.450*** 0.556*** 0.010 1.584*** 
 (0.067) (0.038) (0.229) (0.217) 
     
#Competitors2 -0.005*** -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
#Obs. 30,968 30,968 30,968 30,968 
Note: Description as in Table 4. 
 
Table 10: Markup Entrant Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS FE IV IV FE 
Information (𝜇𝜇) 6.624* -13.508*** -82.830*** -343.046*** 
 (3.865) (3.658) (31.599) (40.906) 
     
Information2  8.764 60.430*** 432.093*** 1083.128*** 
 (10.256) (9.720) (83.353) (107.304) 
     
#Competitors (𝑁𝑁) -0.226*** -0.366*** -0.598*** -1.245*** 
 (0.028) (0.039) (0.093) (0.179) 
     
#Competitors2 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
#Obs. 30,968 30,968 30,968 30,968 
Note: Description as in Table 4. 
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Table 11: Lerner Dispersion Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS FE IV IV FE 
Information (𝜇𝜇) 0.280*** 0.048*** 0.819*** 0.678*** 
 (0.010) (0.006) (0.083) (0.074) 
     
Information2  -0.717*** -0.143*** -2.377*** -1.977*** 
 (0.029) (0.017) (0.221) (0.196) 
     
#Competitors (𝑁𝑁) 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
#Competitors2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
#Obs. 30,968 30,968 30,968 30,968 
Note: Description as in Table 4. 
 
Table 12: Lerner Incumbent Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS FE IV IV FE 
Information (𝜇𝜇) 0.295*** 0.037*** 0.720*** 0.280*** 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.077) (0.047) 
     
Information2  -0.719*** -0.078*** -1.853*** -0.692*** 
 (0.026) (0.011) (0.203) (0.126) 
     
#Competitors (𝑁𝑁) 0.001*** 0.000*** -0.000 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
#Competitors2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
#Obs. 30,968 30,968 30,968 30,968 
Note: Description as in Table 4. 
 
Table 13: Lerner Entrant Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS FE IV IV FE 
Information (𝜇𝜇) 0.014*** -0.012** -0.093** -0.399*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.040) (0.051) 
     
Information2  -0.002 0.065*** 0.509*** 1.291*** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.106) (0.134) 
     
#Competitors (𝑁𝑁) -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
#Competitors2 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
#Obs. 30,968 30,968 30,968 30,968 
Note: Description as in Table 4. 
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Table 14: Semiparametric estimates. Search is nonparametric. Estimation 
by Yatchew’s (1997) method. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Price Dispersion Price Incumbent Price Entrant 
Information (𝜇𝜇) Non-parametric Non-parametric Non-parametric 
    
Control Function for 𝜇𝜇 28.3661*** 17.2032*** -11.1629*** 
 (4.9754) (4.0361) (2.7352) 
    
#Competitors (𝑁𝑁) 1.5565*** 1.3132*** -0.2433*** 
 (0.0574) (0.0466) (0.0315) 
    
#Competitors2 -0.0048*** -0.0043*** 0.0005*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
    
Control Function for 𝑁𝑁 0.7114*** 0.7214*** 0.0100 
 (0.0327) (0.0265) (0.0180) 
R2 0.8312 0.9680 0.9745 
#Obs. 29100 29100 29100 
 
Table 15: Semiparametric estimates. Number of competitors is 
nonparametric. Estimation by Yatchew’s (1997) method. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Price Dispersion Price Incumbent Price Entrant 
#Competitors (𝑁𝑁) Non-parametric Non-parametric Non-parametric 
    
Control Function for 𝑁𝑁 0.6311*** 0.5474*** -0.0837*** 
 (0.0344) (0.0286) (0.0188) 
    
Information (𝜇𝜇) 46.6875*** 44.5950*** -2.0925 
 (6.7593) (5.6165) (3.6873) 
    
Information2  -108.7234*** -98.0224*** 10.7011 
 (19.2810) (16.0211) (10.5181) 
    
Control Function for 𝜇𝜇 16.0103*** 10.9717*** -5.0386** 
 (4.5947) (3.8179) (2.5065) 
R2 0.8140 0.9274 0.9329 
#Obs. 29104 29104 29104 
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